characteristics of modern critique of the economy or modern critique of economic thought as well. The mixing-up of all these things may generate confusion and ambivalence, but it is precisely this otherwise usual mixture of aspects that I want to address in this paper. The notion of "naturalism" is also very general here: I employ it mainly in reference to the intellectual style of modern scientific thought and to the idea of natural laws, although I consider also, more prosaically, situations in which some economic things may be referred to as being natural.
What I call "breaching thought experiments" constitute here a tentative intellectual game rather than a serious research methodology. These experiments resemble, in some way, the breaching experiments developed in the tradition of ethnomethodology.
2 For the purpose of this article, breaching experiments can be defined as a series of annoying questions or situations that aim at bothering a normal course of action in order to reveal what normality is made of, or at least to point to some features of interest. The idea here is to test the behavior of economic reason in some odd situations. These experiments are also thought experiments in the sense that they do not correspond to actual, empirically monitored events. But they are not fully imaginary, however, because they are based on experience gathered in real conversations with economists or with scholars that criticize economics, in real observations of such conversations, in real exposure to economic scholarly publications and in real selfexercising of economic reasoning and of economic critique. The reader is kindly asked to add her own considerations to mine, as both a potential experimenter and a potential experimental subject. But, before pursuing with the experiments, I shall provide an introductory comment with more details about the performativity of economics and about naturalistic style in economic reasoning.
Performativity and naturalism
Scholarly speaking, and although the notion of performativity is connected to a wide variety of academic concerns and intellectual traditions, the precise topic of the performativity of economics is often defined as an emerging research program resulting from the penetration of 2 Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967 ).
Although it is more than reasonable to acknowledge the fact that economists, with their tools and theories, sometimes intervene in the construction of markets, to consider that usual economic things such as "economic preferences", "marginal utility", "transaction costs", "equilibrium prices", "rational expectations", "aggregate demand", "credit risk" or "return on capital" are not naturally-occurring things but rather artificial things which are always the outcome of an intense work of constitution -a work that includes the sciences of the economy among its key ingredients -is probably a more disturbing idea, an idea whose disturbance is best summarized by the provocative adage that can be extracted from Michel
Callon's proposal: that "the economy is embedded not in society but in economics." 8 Further disturbance is added to this by the fact that the problem of truth and falsehood, a problem to which sciences (economic or otherwise) are usually expected to be exposed to, is neatly disregarded, within this viewpoint, in favor of the problem of success and failure. This challenges indeed the efficacy of a purely epistemological critique of economics: the truth or falsehood of economics depends now on its capacity to construct worlds in which its claims can hold together, not on any natural adequacy of these claims to their external objects.
9
Performativity would thus hamper not only science but also, more fatally, the rational critique of science -and these annoyances echo, of course, the objections to constructivism that have often animated science and technology studies in the case of the natural sciences. 10 The idea of the performativity of economics has been indeed critiqued in these or similar terms, sometimes with an explicit reference to its connections to actor-network theory. 11 In substance, this idea, it is said, would remove the strength of an epistemological critique of 8 Callon, "Introduction", in The Laws of the Markets, quote from page 30.
9 Francesco Guala's phrasing conveys this idea well: "Economic rationality is not like Newton's laws, which are supposed to be at work everywhere in the universe. It is a fragile property that must be carefully preserved by creating a hospitable environment." Francesco Guala, "How to Do Things with Experimental Economics," in 15 The structural classification proposed by Philippe Descola adds to naturalism and animism two other forms of intellection, which are totemism and analogism. In naturalism, the universality of physicality is linked to the contingency of interiorities. In animism, the generalization of interiority is a counterpoint to the differentiation of physicalities. Totemism is characterized by a moral and material continuity of physicality and interiority.
Analogism is the realm of multiple differences at both levels, and of multiple networks of correspondence that make the world readable as an ongoing chain of relations. Is naturalism a fundamental characteristic of economic thought? Or is economics an instance of the modern forked tongue? My purpose in this paper is not (and could not be) to try to settle this issue. It is, at best, to provide some elements that could help considering the case of economic reason with a few observations on the "naturalistic style" often displayed in economics or about economics. The claim on the performativity of economics can intervene in this inquiry as an assertion that breaches the naturalistic style of economic thought, but also as a test of the forked tongue hypothesis. In what follows, I propose a series of situations (which I have referred to as "breaching thought experiments") that allow characterizing several aspects of this question.
Experiment 1: name both science and object
It is easy to recognize in economics a sort of a naturalistic style, which is of course acknowledged to a great extent. We may all have different cultures, opinions, beliefs, but we all share the same economic laws. Money is money here and elsewhere. Budgetary constraints are budgetary constraints here and elsewhere. Marginal utility is marginal utility here and elsewhere. We may have all different preferences, but we all certainly have such a thing as "economic preferences" that can be taken into account economically and aggregated together into some sort of an economic calculation. Any sort of process, regardless of its particular point and scope, as soon as it is costly (and any process may be costly) is economic in nature and thus prone to economic analysis. Economic characteristics do characterize individuals, but also groups, families, countries, firms, and also natural resources, ecosystems, animals or, why not, cells, neurons and computer programs. This seems naturalistic indeed: a reason that goes through all and unifies all, an economic nature that is transversal to all bodies and to all souls. Is economic reason the paramount naturalistic reason?
Let me point to a most curious index of naturalization that characterizes economic reason, an index that is actually more visible in French that in English. Although in the English vocabulary a difference is often drawn between economics (the science) and the economy (the thing), in French the same word may be used to refer to both: économie.
L'économie is "the economy", but also "economics" in the sense of the academic discipline.
The later can also be referred to as sciences économiques, but économie corresponds to a fairly widespread use, especially among professionals of the discipline. Of course, such anecdotal comments should not stand in place of references to a long and fruitful tradition in the history of ideas that explores the naturalistic style in economic reason. This tradition has studied at length the construction of the categories of modern economics, starting with the notion of economic individual, the notion of self-interest, the notion of utility, and so forth, including also the study of how mathematics and formalistic languages in general have allowed economics to emancipate, as a science, from moral philosophy. 18 But it is nonetheless interesting to stop at issues such as the ordinary naming of economics. Is economics the knowledge or the object of knowledge? In French, this question (our first "breaching thought experiment") is in effect slightly annoying, and revealing. And perhaps in English too, especially in American English, a language in which a political speech on "economics" can indeed meant to be on the current state of affairs in the national economy or, conversely, praise for the importance of "the economy" can indeed signify a call for more attention to scientific economic thinking. ("You mean economicology"). This instance of a "breaching thought experiment" is based on a real conversation with a British academic on how to translate slightly ambiguous expressions like "économie des conventions" or "économie alternative", for which both "economics" and "economy" may make sense. 
Experiment 2: the object of economics (natural or social)
Consider economics (the science) as a whole and ask the question of its object. More prosaically, ask to an economist: "What kind of object does your science look at?" You may then introduce some annoying element and refine the question as follows: "But do you study objects which are natural or which are social?" Insist: "Is your science a social science or a natural science?"
Well, of course, we may easily say that economics study the economy, and that the economy is a human invention, so the science that studies it is therefore a human or social science. However, the experiment is far from providing such a straightforward conclusion. 
Experiment 3: money in a constructivist situation
Let us explore further these strange features of the style of economic reason. The economy is probably one site in which the expression "social construction of" is less meaningful. To say that the economy is socially constructed may be as pointless as saying that society is socially constructed: of course it is. Economic institutions are artificial by definition. Money is a cultural artifact, and so are the market, the factory and the firm. Economy is done, made up, not given in nature. Even economists from the hardest laissez-faire traditions can agree on this. But, by a strange loop of reason, economic categories suddenly appear as more natural than natural. Economic laws are not laws in the primary sense of the word, which means political rules instituted by human beings, but laws in the sense of the laws of nature, which are universal and independent from any political endeavor. This loop, this drift of economic reason, does not only happen among economists. Of course, they are the first to benefit from this effect of naturalization or of exteriority. But this loop is shared by everybody, in a certain sense, and shared specifically by critiques of economics.
The setting of our third "breaching thought experiment" is a constructivist situation: a scholarly conference in which radically constructivist or relativist perspectives are used in order to address objects which are usually considered as natural realities, such as physical space or time. This could be, for instance, a conference on science and technology studies.
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In this setting, it is possible to attend lectures or presentations in which categories as hard as time and space (i.e. primary qualities, in the philosophical sense) are said to actually look universal only because of an intense work that accomplishes them as universal. 24 But, some attendees would convincingly explain, since this work is partial and contingent, this leads indeed to a multiplicity of forms of organizing spacing and timing, best referred to as verbs. renders all things and beings commensurable and alienable, and which therefore informs, or constructs, particularly globalized and uniformed forms of timing and spacing. The breach is introduced by a redirection of constructivism to money, perhaps with a naïve remark such as:
"But I thought money was the thing that was socially constructed."
When economic things (money, capital, markets) appear as explanatory factors in radically constructivists accounts of supposedly natural things (space, time), one could expect an equitable use of constructivism. Actually, one could have thought of money as an easier target to relativism than time or space. There might exist several spaces and several times, but there surely exist several monies, several types of markets and several accounting methods.
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And still, economic categories can intervene in a constructivist appraisal of the natural world in a much unconstructed fashion: as universal realities that provide a univocal explanation of global unity. The continuity of time and space might be an illusion. But capital is the ultimate primary quality. The outcome of this somehow likely "breaching thought experiment" is the relative resistance to constructivism of economic reasoning, the tendency of economics to side with explanatory variables instead of with constructed ones or, better, to stand as a fixed point around which turns the rest of the world.
Experiment 4: the question of fiction and reality
Ask an economist: "Are your models fictitious or real?" This is a test on the ambivalence of economics toward its object. Economics has often been accused of dealing with fictional particularly salient one. 31 If addressed at these economists and their teachers, our "breaching thought experiment" might have triggered an interesting set of well-structured but at some point slightly paradoxical reactions, wavering between a lesson on the distinction between normative and positive economics and a comment on the political usefulness of being scientifically right.
Is this another example of modernistic forked tongue? Do economists tell they unveil economic laws but then actually institute them? Even in the hardest laissez-faire traditions of contemporary neoliberal economics, there is a realist sense of the fact that markets are constructed and that economists may need to work as constructors if they want to achieve their policy project, as pointed out by Michel Foucault in the case of neoliberal economics.
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Perhaps the key to this experiment does not lie in the choice between reality and fiction (several compromises are possible in this respect) but in the position of the narrator as an author -of fictions or of realities. The economist can claim authorship of her axiomatic models without much trouble. But she would probably prefer to fade out in favor of markets themselves as authors of economic realities. This ellipsis is particularly important to neoliberal approaches, since, according to these, markets are supposed to be more intelligent than economists.
Experiment 5: economics is performative
Let us now turn to a "natural-occurring experiment": Michel Callon's programmatic call and some subsequent critical reactions. 33 I use some of the critics here, with all respect due, as the victims of one imaginary "breaching thought experiment" on the polemical behavior of Talking about the performative efficacy of economics in constructing such world of calculation would be a way of taking stock in this illusion.
36 34 My opinion is that the most relevant ingredient of the critique of the thesis of the performativity of economics (far more than definitional subtleties or empirical evidence and counterevidence) is infuriation, which is why I think this critique is prone to the treatment I offer here. 35 Miller, "Turning Callon the Right Way Up." See also James G. Carrier and Daniel Miller, ed., Virtualism: A New Political Economy (Oxford: Berg, 1998 41 If we play with Descola's structural categories, we could think of the role of Callon in this "breaching thought experiment" as impersonating the menace of analogism over naturalism, i.e. the menace of a style of intellection that would be attentive to varied correspondences between economists and economies, both imitating each other, engendering each other.
By way of conclusion
I believe that some naturalistic style intervenes at the surface of economics, but that the hypothesis of the modern forked tongue (claiming naturalism while blatantly performing) applies also quite well to the case of economic reason. Maybe our five "breaching thought experiments" (a method of inquiry that I think is worthwhile considering effective to a certain extent) serve the clarification of this point well. The first experiment (on the naming of economic science) brought evidence of a naturalizing subconscious in economic academic parlance. The second experiment (on economics as social or natural science) revealed a highly unchallenged universalism, with an object that is highly general and undetermined. The third experiment (on economics in constructivist situations) demonstrated a high degree of resistance of economics to any kind of relativism or constructivism. The fourth experiment (on the fictitious character of economic theory) made explicit some ambivalence on the reality of the object of economics. The fifth experiment (on the performativity of economics) pointed to some traumatic features of the modern critical position when it comes down to economics.
Perhaps our fifth experiment focused too much on the potential behavior of the critique of economics and failed to address the behavior of economics itself. How would the paramount modern economist react to the idea, preferably formulated in a bold manner, that her science provokes the world it studies? Will she be shocked? Or would she rather remain indifferent? 42 She might just say something along the line of: "Yeah, thanks, we knew already." Adding perhaps: "But if we do that it's because we're right." Performative pride, wrapped up into a naturalistic epistemological layer? That is only a hypothesis, but a plausible and interesting one. When you say that the book of nature is written in economic language but then you get caught in the act with that book in one hand and a pen in the other, well, the wisest thing to do is probably to smile at the camera and say that, ok, you were writing it but you were writing it nicely. On the overall, it is interesting to note that the performativity 42 In recent critical comments on the topic of the performativity of economics, David Colander (a reputable economist) says among other things that he does not understand the notion of performativity very well, that he dislikes it and finds it irritating, that proponents in that field think this topic is new but in reality it is not, that the point is about signaling a contradiction in economics but that there is no such contradiction, that most 
